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MODERNISM IN 
THE ANIMAL 
TRAP?
Oxana Timofeeva
Stalking the Subject: Modernism 
and the Animal by Carrie Rohman. 
New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009. Pp 208. $90.00 cloth, 
$29.50 paper.
It’s interesting to observe how ani-
mal studies, or, to be more precise, 
critical animal studies, occupies a 
more and more significant place 
among what is broadly called 
human sciences. This is a part of a 
massive twentieth-century tectonic 
shift, where the very core of human 
sciences, i.e., the human itself, meets 
its limit. The human subject bids 
farewell to its dream of autonomy 
and attempts to define itself from 
without, through various figures of 
the nonhuman, the latter thought 
of in terms of radical alterity. This 
move tries to embrace the unstable 
domain beyond the border of hu-
manity and, among nonhuman 
others, the animal is the most insis-
tent and striking. The animal ac-
companied humanity, as its mirror 
twin, from its very birth in Paleo-
lithic caves, and the animal is still 
here, still promising to reveal some-
thing that humans cannot grasp 
about themselves.
Long after the Cartesian for-
mula, linking the subject and the 
thought, the philosophy of animal-
ity turns to the question of how to 
think about this mode of existence 
that supposedly does not think it-
self. As opposed to the classical 
philosophical tradition character-
ized by an almost general disre-
gard towards animals as a being 
deprived of thought, language, 
consciousness or subjectivity, con-
temporary thinkers working at 
the crossroads of animal studies, 
critical philosophy, and human and 
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natural science are mainly trying to 
think about animality as another 
kind of subjectivity either by prag-
matically locating this question 
in the domain of ethics, politics, 
and science or along the lines of a 
theoretical and critical deconstruc-
tion of classical philosophy and the 
metaphysical tradition. The animal 
turn in human sciences, most gen-
erally inspired, perhaps, by Peter 
Singer’s practical ethics and ani-
mal liberation movement, but also 
by the theoretical interventions of 
Deleuze and European post-Hei-
deggerianism, shapes a peculiar 
crossing point between philosophy, 
politics, psychoanalysis, literature, 
and other arts.
Carrie Rohman’s Stalking the 
Subject is a good example of inter-
disciplinary academic research in 
this field. It applies posthumanist 
theory to literary studies—namely, 
to studies in British modernist liter-
ature. Rohman thus does not speak 
about modernism in general, or the 
subject in general, or the animal in 
general; her work consists of criti-
cal analysis of works by T. S. Eliot, 
Joseph Conrad, D. H. Lawrence, 
H. G. Wells, and Djuna Barnes that 
focus on the figure of the animal or 
animality. Such a clear framework, 
however, allows the author to make 
rather deep observations about so-
called human nature as it is repre-
sented in this specific historical and 
cultural context, and to interrogate 
the most universal questions about 
the limits of humanity as tested by 
various experiences of sexuality, 
violence, poetry, etc.
Rohman emphasizes that her 
work is mostly inspired by Gary 
Wolf’s philozoophy, but work by Ju-
dith Butler, Slavoj Žižek, Gilles De-
leuze, George Bataille, and Jacques 
Derrida—authors who deal with 
the human rather than with the an-
imal, properly speaking—are other 
primary references. If Gary Wolf 
is searching for a “proper” nonhu-
man animal, Rohman addresses in-
stead the experience of the human 
animal, exploring the thresholds 
and the borders, the places whereof 
the human and animal encounter 
each other within the world of the 
human rather than in the realm of 
the supposed animality per se. The 
question here, then, is not about 
what constitutes the animal, but 
how the animal makes humans 
think about themselves. Literature 
is taken as a place of such encoun-
ters because as the world of words, 
the domain of an extremely culti-
vated language, it tends to meet its 
opposite, the nonspeaking animal, 
as its very ontological limit.
Modernist literature gives es-
pecially wide room for rethinking 
subjectivity through its relation 
to the animal. As compared to a 
classical canon, in which animals 
generally serve as representations 
of human merits and defeats, mod-
ernism takes animals seriously. 
Doing so creates another form of 
cultural sensibility and new modes 
of expression, different from those 
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found in classical humanist univer-
sality. Modernism establishes a kind 
of imaginary space, inhabited by 
and crossed by transitional, mon-
strous figures, in which human be-
ings hardly recognize themselves. 
These are figures of the retreat of 
the human, of the failure of the 
humanist project, or the end of the 
anthropic perspective. Modernist 
desire is constituted around the sys-
tem of distorting mirrors in which 
faces are altered. From such mir-
rors, various nonhuman “others” 
are staring back at “us,” incessantly 
bothering, troubling, and bringing 
into question our properties and 
identities.
Together with the other major 
representative of the nonhuman, 
the machine, the animal is the main 
object (or subject?) of modern-
ist fears and phobias (like all those 
famous animal phobias in Freud), 
but also the main subject of desires, 
hopes, and expectations. Thus, the 
(chrono)logical order of Rohman’s 
narration about modernist subjec-
tivity, always obsessed or haunted 
by the ghost of animality, develops 
in an explicit move from phobia to 
desire, from abjection to fascina-
tion, from rejection to dissolution.
Rohman’s own understanding 
of modernism, first of all, refers 
back to the discoveries of Freud 
and Darwin. She identifies a cru-
cial point in the history of culture 
when the arrogance of Western hu-
manist subject faces the fact of its 
animal ancestry:
The discourse of species in 
modernism is specifically 
framed by this dialectic 
between Darwinism and 
Freudianism, which further 
explains the centrality of the 
human/animal dichotomy 
in literature of the period. 
Indeed, the development of 
psychoanalysis in the early 
twentieth century should 
be contextualized as a logi-
cal response to the humanist 
crisis set in motion by evolu-
tionary theory. (22)
Starting from this point, human-
kind step by step loses its privilege 
over the rest of the animal king-
dom and has to recognize that it 
bears in itself all the indelible traces 
of its animal past.
As Rohman emphasizes, Dar-
win revealed that human beings 
were not God’s creatures, onto-
logically different from all other 
species, but just a certain—albeit a 
highest—level of a general evolu-
tionary chain. Freud, for his part, 
showed that “traces of human-
ity’s own origins were still em-
bedded in the individual’s mental 
and physical structures” (6). In 
both cases, man turns out to be 
“the animal among others” (and 
this is the title of the chapter in 
which Rohman defines her theo-
retical and methodological appara-
tuses). Traditional humanism will 
try to save face when confronted 
with these discoveries, to keep the 
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privilege of men, and if in Darwin 
there is still a certain species hier-
archy, which gives a rule for social 
Darwinians to esteem one race or 
another according to its higher or 
lower degree of “humanity” or 
“animality,” then in Freud there is 
an obligation to transcend animal 
nature in the course of individual 
human development. However, 
these two paradigmatic shifts—the 
one of the evolution of species and 
the other of the unconscious—al-
ready trigger a double anxiety pro-
duced by the idea of the existence of 
the animal other either as a neighbor 
from the outside, with whom we 
nevertheless share a single species 
universe, or as a very nonhuman in-
side of the human subject itself.
Chapter 2, “Imperialism and 
Disavowal,” starts with a critique of 
the limits of a postcolonial approach, 
which “has privileged the catego-
ries or race and gender in an effort 
to rearticulate our understanding 
of modernism’s imperialists bina-
ries” but “has failed to examine the 
fact that these discourses sought 
justification through the discourse 
of species” (29). Rohman empha-
sizes this underestimation of the 
species question in gender and 
queer studies, as well, reminding 
us again and again that repres-
sions and oppressions within the 
human world actually derive from 
our primal repression and rejec-
tion of animality. Certain humans 
sometimes find themselves beyond 
the border of humanity precisely 
because this border exists and pro-
duces itself, so that the domain of 
the human shapes itself through the 
function of exclusion. According 
to Rohman, “displacing animality 
onto marginalized groups, whether 
they be Jews, blacks, women, or the 
poor, is a common feature of mod-
ernist literature” (29). Thus, T. S. 
Eliot’s “Sweeney among the Night-
ingales” (1920) inscribes animality 
into a framework of the “lowness” 
of human impulses, and the racial 
other, in particular the Jew, and the 
sexual other, the woman, clearly 
rise behind the poet’s species imagi-
nary. Sweeney as a figure of confu-
sion can never fully erase his own 
unclean animal nature and thus 
generalizes the poet’s heteropho-
bia and misogyny. Conrad’s Heart 
of Darkness (1899), in turn, draws a 
figure of “Africanized animality”: 
men’s animal nature “is textually 
embodied by Africa and Africans” 
(46), and the process of civiliza-
tion echoes the process of evolu-
tion as a means of “transcending” 
this “dark” nature. Finally, “D. H. 
Lawrence must also be numbered 
among the modernist writers who 
deploy the discourses of species and 
of races to explore the contours of 
the human” (52). Lawrence’s at-
titude is clearly idealistic and nos-
talgic “for the preindustrial and 
precivilized man” (53) when, for 
example, in his The Plumed Ser-
pent (1926) the writer pictures the 
ambiguity of the relationships be-
tween Americans and Mexicans. 
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All three cases demonstrate both 
an insistence on animal ancestry as 
a background of the so-called civi-
lized society and the racial drama 
already paradoxically inscribed in a 
kind of posthuman perspective.
If the texts analyzed in chapter 
2 generally “project animality away 
from the Western subject,” then 
the characters depicted in chapter 
3, “Facing the Animal,” reveal “the 
inevitable return of animality for 
the European” (64). The most strik-
ing example here is H. G. Wells’s 
The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896), 
which exposes “the repression in-
herent in an Enlightenment project 
of transcendence that attempted to 
deanimalize the human subject” 
(64). This text, Rohman claims, 
“bears witness to the inherent vio-
lence of the humanizing process 
which creates Jacques Lacan’s split 
subject” (72). The voice of the ani-
mal (the puma’s scream at the hor-
rifying Moreau’s factory), which 
suffers enormously in order to be 
transformed into a rational being, 
expresses this rupture, dramatically 
inscribed into human culture as its 
constitutive moment of pain. In his 
later novella, The Croquet Player 
(1937), Wells “narrativizes the dia-
lectic between evolution and psy-
choanalysis” (64); animal ancestry 
appears as a kind of ghost from the 
past, becoming the basis of an indi-
vidual’s deep neurotic structure.
The last part of this chapter 
returns to Lawrence’s idealistic 
appeals to the infinite wisdom of 
animal nature. His poem “Fish” 
(1923) is especially remarkable on 
this point, since here the fish serves 
as an example of a being living in 
its own element or environment. 
Silent fish in water appear as the 
very image of immanence, of ani-
mal’s conformity to its natural es-
sence: in this analysis, Rohman 
refers to Heidegger’s and Bataille’s 
speculations on the immanence of 
animal nature, best of all symbol-
ized and expressed by “fishness.” In 
his poetic fascination, Lawrence is 
trapped by this kind of metaphysi-
cal projection. The radical alter-
ity of the fish, as celebrated by the 
author, reflects a sort of passeist 
utopia, which, being pushed to the 
extreme, in Lawrence’s poem ends 
up suggesting both the vitalist con-
ception of the unknowable and ir-
reducible animal world, as well as 
the Christian symbolism of the fish.
Since Lawrence “is perhaps the 
British modernist most engaged 
with the species problem through-
out his work,” which “signals a 
deepening disgust with humanism 
in its rational mode” (100), chap-
ter 4, “Recuperating the Animal,” 
concentrates on his novels Women 
in Love (1920) and St. Mawr (1925). 
According to Rohman, “[T]he ani-
mal possesses the kind of being that 
Lawrence wants to recuperate in 
humans, a being that rejects mech-
anistic forms of self-consciousness 
and embraces radical mystery” 
(101). She emphasizes the ideologi-
cal gesture of privileging ontology 
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over epistemology, characteristic of 
both Lawrence and Heidegger, but 
draws our attention to the fact that 
whereas in Heidegger the animal is 
“poor in world,” in Lawrence’s nos-
talgic antihumanism animals rather 
enjoy a more pure mode of being, 
“unspoiled by cultural reification 
and intellectual posturing” (111), 
which can reveal itself, in par-
ticular, through human sexuality.
Consequently, Rohman’s final 
chapter, “Revising the Human,” 
represents an attempt to pave the 
way to a literary becoming-ani-
mal through sexual peripeties in 
Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood (1936). 
Its main character, Robin Vote, 
“figures nonidentity as a form of 
subjectivity . . . where the nonlin-
guistic, the undecidable, and the 
animal serve to revise what counts 
as human” (133). Yet, this version 
of utopia is organized around the 
spoilt  upper-class subject’s desire 
to return to nature (embodied in 
the rather idealistic figure of Robin 
as a wild woman, who, with her 
“openness towards alterity,” fi-
nally escapes the human realm), 
the modernist desire to transgress 
the limits of human with all the 
restrictions of its language, society, 
etc., the utopia of a nonrepressed 
sexuality as an ultimate liberating 
practice. However, sexuality is mis-
leading. It will never bring us to the 
animal; even in imitating animality 
it goes in the opposite direction—
not towards a final “revising” of 
the human, but towards further 
refining the human, by means of a 
sexual transgression.
It seems that if for classical liter-
ature and literary studies an animal 
stands as a metaphor for a human, 
then in Carrie Rohman’s book it 
stands for a metaphor for a non-
human, but a nonhuman always 
already related to a certain kind of 
human. A human and a nonhuman 
here are produced by each other, 
and Rohman’s book interprets dif-
ferent kinds of human subjectivity 
as produced by and rising from the 
metaphorical encounter with the 
animal. Similarly to the protago-
nist of Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood, 
who cannot find her way among 
repressive human identities, albeit 
woman or lesbian, since they are 
all insufficient in comparison to her 
radical gesture of becoming-ani-
mal, the author theoretically goes 
further than postcolonial, gender, 
and other identity studies, by trying 
to examine the very limits of these 
identities posed by animality. But is 
this ultimate shift to animality ever 
really possible? It seems that the 
subjectivities at stake demonstrate, 
in various ways, the impossibility 
either of an ultimate detachment 
from what is called “the animal 
nature” or of an ultimate attach-
ment to it, marked by the desire to 
become-animal. Perhaps literature 
itself, and modernist literature in 
particular, are the symptom of this 
very impossibility. The question 
that should be raised here is how to 
escape the new opposition between 
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the “bad” human and the “good” 
animal, which would be a reversal 
of the classical binary based on the 
affirmation of exclusively human 
merits (thought, awareness of 
death, language, etc.)? How to 
escape the trap of the vitalist be-
lief—deeply inscribed in modern-
ist culture itself—in a form of life 
as a “natural” or bodily force of resis-
tance against repressive human in-
stitutions without thinking through 
the complex ambiguity of the rela-
tions of the two? But even if this 
trap is unavoidable, the injection 
of animality into critical discourse 
remains extremely useful. The 
generalized animal other of moder-
nity is like a good psychoanalyst: it 
causes the human to speak out his 
or her fears and radical doubts, to 
confess, to verbalize various “sins” 
the human is made of.
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